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Almost twenty years after its inception the Russian Federation still lacks a stable, 
formal, legal, and legitimate plan for presidential succession.  The absence of such a 
plan, law, or formula inevitably places the Russian government in a state of permanent 
illegitimacy and potential, if not actual, crisis.  Neither are such crises confined to 
domestic political issues for, as we shall see, the unresolved nature of the current 
succession has generated increasingly visible cleavages between the Putin and 
Medvedev camps in Russian foreign and defense policy, not just debates about the 
agenda of domestic political and economic reform.  This defect in Russia’s “constitution” 
is not a haphazard or unplanned one.  Rather it reflects the pre-modern, even neo-
Tsarist nature of the Russian state, a nature that not only ensures recurrent political, 
foreign policy, and economic crises, but one that also guarantees consistently sub-
optimal outcomes in all these domains.
This pre-modern quality is not the fact that Russian elections are stage-managed 
performances directed from above.  Rather this archaic aspect rests in the fact that a 
president can hand-pick his successor, and give him the state as if it were his personal 
possession and bequest.  In other words, like the Tsars, Russian rulers view the 
Russian Federation as their property and patrimony (Votchina in Russian), something 
that is exclusively theirs to bequeath to whomever they like.  Likewise, they reject the 
idea that the President or the Tsar (or, for that matter the General Secretary) must 
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account to any individual or any institution.  The separation of state powers, 
accountability before the law (or Parliament), and other, similar notions, are not only 
anathema to Russia’s leaders, they are utterly foreign to their cognitive landscape.  
Thus, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov publicly characterized democracy as a 
“Bardak”, i.e. a particularly slovenly brothel. (1) Therefore, we should not be surprised 
that contemporary Russia not only emulates the Tsarist “constitution” or structure of 
government, but in many ways represents an updated representation of Tsarist service 
state, just as the Soviet model was, in countless ways, a modern manifestation of the 
Tsarist system. (2)
Given the winner-take-all aspect of political and, thus, economic power in this system, it 
is, in fact, quite logical that rulers cannot abide by a formalized succession formula 
especially as this autocratic system has given them wealth and influence beyond their 
wildest dreams, and power, as Henry Kissinger famously remarked, “is the ultimate 
aphrodisiac.”  Consequently, “The power gained, we will never surrender.” (3) But, that 
attitude ensures that the legal nihilism against which Medvedev campaigns is intrinsic 
to, and intertwined in, the Russian political system, which cannot function without it.  
With this legal nihilism comes a level of corruption and criminality that is so pervasively 
fundamental that it defies the government’s anti-corruption campaign.  Indeed, foreign 
diplomats and intelligence officers privately characterize Russia as a mafia state where, 
for example, 30-50 percent of the defense budget is regularly stolen, a significant 
portion by generals, rather than just the political leaders. (4)  Such corruption and 
criminality pervades the entire state, not just the military.
Equally unsurprising is the fact that the state operates under an ideology it calls 
“sovereign democracy,” which emphasizes its own untrammeled sovereignty; it is this 
policy that Russian leaders seem to adhere to abroad, namely a free hand to do as they 
please. They pursue this free hand in other former Soviet states, in particular.  The 
existence of a permanent “state of siege” between Russia and the world owes much 
more to the underlying elements fundamental to Russian policy and outlooks than it 
does to specific European and American policies, whatever their faults may be.
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Unresolved Succession & Foreign Policy Crises
The visible signs of a growing crisis of the state, for example the poor performance of 
the ruling party United Russia in the March 2010 elections, the gathering protests 
throughout Russia against Putin and his system, persistent economic crisis, and multi-
faceted backwardness all suggest that this system’s consolidation under Putin may 
prove to be short-lived, leading to major political struggles, if not crises, between now 
and the next presidential election in 2012.    Likewise, the visible political struggles 
between Putin’s and Medvedev’s teams over “modernization,” as well as economic and 
political reforms show that the effort to create a tandemocracy, or dual power structure, 
seems to justify Russia’s historic apprehension about such a system, even though this 
Russian political creation does not reflect any true constitutional separation of powers.  
But, apart from the fact that this neo-Tsarist system cannot avoid breeding recurring 
domestic and even systemic political and economic crises, the tandemocracy also has 
led to dangerous foreign policy decisions that could lead to very costly consequences 
for Russia.
For example, the constitution states that foreign and defense policies remain the 
prerogative of the president, yet Putin, even before the Georgian war of 2008, also 
seemed to be trying to conduct his own security and foreign policy by planting hints 
among military men that Russia should restore its relations with Cuba and establish an 
air base there.  He even sent his close confidants Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin 
and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to Cuba in 2008 to discuss enhanced 
cooperation between the two states.  Given Patrushev’s position as Head of the 
Security Council, this could only mean defense cooperation.  Such moves clearly were 
aimed to irritate the United States.  Cuban officials refused to bite because these plans 
were announced publicly without consulting them in advance, clear evidence that they 
served interests other than those of Cuba. (5) Cuba’s Foreign Minister even denied any 
knowledge of the Russian plan for deploying military sites there, and Fidel Castro 
publicly praised Raul Castro’s restraint in refusing to be provoked by Moscow or by the 
US Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, who warned that such a base 
would be crossing the red line. (6)
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Not only did Sechin promote economic deals and arms sales to Cuba, Venezuela, and 
Nicaragua, he also discussed with them the formation of an alliance as “Moscow 
considers the formation of such a union a worthy response to US activity in the former 
Soviet Union and the placement of missile defenses in Poland and the Czech 
Republic.” (7) Not surprisingly, Sechin reported to Putin that Moscow should upgrade its 
relations with these countries, in particular, and with Latin America, in general. (8)  If 
such an alliance were to materialize with the Russian proposed visible military 
component and arms sales, it would represent a serious threat to Latin American and 
U.S. interests.
In March 2009, it became clear that certain Moscow factions still were trying to militarize 
ties to Latin America.  Lt. General Anatoli Zikharev, Commander in Chief (CINC) of 
Russia’s Long-Range Aviation, claimed that President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela had 
offered the island of L’Orchila as a temporary base for his forces, i.e. strategic bombers, 
and that Cuba could also serve such a purpose.  Chavez quickly backpedaled, saying 
that he had only said Russian planes could land there if this fit into Moscow’s plans.  
Cuba, meanwhile, again remained silent.  Obviously somebody in Moscow wanted to 
raise this issue and the Air Force and Navy clearly want such bases.  But, since then no 
mention of the issue has appeared, indicating that the government quashed the whole 
idea. (9) Nevertheless, it appears that Latin American policy is an issue linking Chavez 
with Russia’s “hawks” and siloviki (politicians and other individuals close to Putin who 
are alumni of the power structures, police, army, etc.) in the Russian political struggle.
However, Putin did not stop here.  Close examination of Russian defense policy and 
foreign policy regarding the question of rapprochement with the US, based on the 
Obama Administration’s reset policy, either has triggered a series of major new policy 
debates among political and military leaders or invigorated existing debates. (10) One 
such issue is the question of whether or not the impending arms control treaty with 
Washington should formally tie strategic offenses to missile defenses as a condition of 
its being submitted for ratification.  In particular, many within Russia’s military argue for 
an increase in spending on nuclear weapons, in order to build more than are currently 
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planned.  Even as Medvedev was hailing the progress being made in negotiating this 
arms control treaty and predicting that a final version was close at hand, Putin stepped 
in to assert himself and to play to the hawks’ gallery.  On December 28, 2009, in 
Vladivostok he said, 
“The problem is that our American partners are developing missile defenses, and we 
are not, ... But the issues of missile defense and offensive weapons are closely 
interconnected ... There could be a danger that having created an umbrella against 
offensive strike systems, our partners may come to feel completely safe. After the 
balance is broken, they will do whatever they want and grow more aggressive .... In 
order to preserve a balance, while we aren’t planning to build a missile defense of our 
own, as it’s very expensive and its efficiency is not quite clear yet, we have to develop 
offensive strike systems.” (11)
Nonetheless, at the March 5, 2010 expanded session of the Defense Ministry Collegium 
Medvedev made it clear that Russia does not need to increase its offensive nuclear 
capability any further than was originally planned. (12) Thus, the divisions between the 
two leaders on this issue are out in the open.  But, they do not end here.  During the 
visit to Moscow in March 2010 by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Putin and Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov each announced that Russia would complete construction of the 
Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran during the summer of 2010.  Lavrov added that this 
would help to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would remain peaceful, as it would be 
subject to regular inspection visits by the IAEA.
When Mrs. Clinton was asked about the announcement at the news conference, she 
said, “We think it would be premature to go forward with any project at this time, 
because we want to send an unequivocal message to the Iranians.” Mr. Lavrov 
responded unequivocally, saying, “The project will be completed.” (13)
During the trip to Moscow, Clinton had to schedule time to meet with Putin, in order to 
wrap up negotiations on the nuclear arms treaty because, in addition to trying to lock in 
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Russia’s support for additional sanctions against Iran, Mrs. Clinton also is working on 
sealing a nuclear arms deal that would replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or 
START. As the paramount political figure in Russia, Mr. Putin’s assent might be needed 
for both. (14)
There are also charges that Putin undermined Medvedev on the issue of the US transit 
center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan.  In February 2009 Medvedev claimed that it was entirely 
within Kyrgyzstan’s discretion to terminate the US lease on the base and that the 
decision had nothing to do with a Russian loan to Kyrgyzstan; Putin subsequently told 
Kyrgyz Premier Daniyar Usenov that the loan was explicitly for the purpose of 
constructing the hydroelectric facility at Kambarata and that it was conditional on the 
closure of the US base. (15)
Clearly Putin’s line is more confrontational vis-à-vis the US and more heavily reliant on 
military threats to the United States and Europe.   Putin also appears more risk-
acceptant of military confrontation with Washington than does Medvedev and, as such, 
his approach is decidedly more risky for Russia.  As the leader of the energy faction, 
Putin also is clearly trying to control energy policy decisions and maximize Russia’s 
leverage in the CIS, Europe, and Asia on energy issues.  But, he has also launched an 
ongoing challenge to Medvedev on a critical international economic issue, namely the 
issue of Russia joining the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The WTO Question
Russian entry into the WTO has been a high priority for both the US and Russia, but 
has been surrounded by difficulties on both sides.  Nevertheless, by the time of the St. 
Petersburg Economic Conference in June 2009 US diplomats believed and said publicly 
that they thought Russia could enter into the WTO very soon. (16) However, one week 
later on June 11, Putin abruptly pulled the rug out from under this deal and said that 
Russia would only join the WTO as part of a customs union with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, not as a single state and, further, that these governments had fully agreed 
to this.  In fact trade “wars” between Russia and these partners had taken place prior to 
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June and have since continued, thus suggesting Russian coercion, rather than genuine 
unity among the states.  Moreover, the WTO has no provisions for entry of such a bloc 
and each of these countries individually was already at a different stage in the 
negotiations over entry into the WTO.   Lastly, it became clear that these states had not 
fully agreed to Putin’s proposal as they expressed their reservations in public, albeit 
diplomatically. (17) In other words, Putin attempted to force the issue with new 
conditions and to draw “a line in the sand” after Medvedev had come very close to 
making a deal. (18)
There can be little doubt that both Putin and Medvedev have placed a high priority in 
both word and deed on instituting the economic integration of the CIS around Russia, 
and in particular a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. (19) Medvedev even 
suggested that such integration could be a factor in helping CIS states climb out of the 
current economic crisis. (20) However, Putin did him no favor even if he wanted to 
register Russian anger over the length of time it has taken to get into the WTO.  Here 
again, Putin not only wanted to show that he was boss, but also to confront the US and 
the West by deliberately insisting on a procedure that the WTO could not accept.  
Moreover, both here and vis-à-vis Kyrgyzstan he exposed the nakedly coercive element 
of Russian foreign economic policy, which Moscow normally is at pains to conceal.  
Worse yet, Moscow has had to retreat gradually from this position as it has become 
clear that the WTO would not take in a customs bloc nor were Belarus and 
Kazakhstan’s leaders prepared to surrender their states’ economic sovereignty to 
Russia.  Thus, despite continued public proclamations of Putin’s position, Moscow, in 
fact, is dropping ever more hints that it now wants the quickest possible entry into the 
WTO, even if it must join as an individual state. (21)
Indeed, it turns out that negotiations on a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan 
could take up to two years, further delaying Russia’s accession (according to Putin’s 
scenario) to the WTO. (22) Moreover Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
has ordered his government to accelerate the process of acceding to the WTO.  
Specifically, he said that “while supporting regional economic unions within the CIS, the 
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government should step up the process of joining the WTO on conditions that are 
consistent with the priorities of Kazakhstan’s economic growth.” (23) So, it is hardly 
likely that Kazakhstan will rush into joining what supporters of this customs union like 
Pavel Borodin, Secretary of the Union State of Belarus and Russia, frankly call a 
revived Soviet Union. (24) Nonetheless, Putin was undeterred from threatening 
Secretary of State Clinton that without Russia’s full accession to the WTO, full 
cooperation with the United States is not possible. (25) In other words, Putin persists in 
pursuing a more overtly confrontational foreign policy line towards Washington than 
does Medvedev.
Conclusions
It is obvious that the Putin-Medvedev rivalry affects Russian politics and domestic 
economic policy to the point where Medvedev had to say that, “The final responsibility 
for what happens in the country and for the important decisions taken would rest on my 
shoulders alone and I would not be able to share this responsibility with anyone.” (26) 
However, this rivalry has spread into some of the most sensitive and high priority areas 
of Russian foreign policy, arms control and the economic integration of the CIS and 
WTO accession.  This ongoing contest likely will continue at least until the next 
presidential election in 2012.  Until and unless Russia resolves its presidential 
succession formula and establishes a legally incontestable and legitimate process, 
these kinds of conflicts surely will recur in both domestic and foreign policy after 2012, 
just as they existed before 2008. (27)
These conflicts underscore not just Russia’s regressiveness in political and economic 
terms, but also its unpredictability in world politics.  Its succession defects are intimately, 
indeed, inescapably, bound up with its foreign and domestic policies that ensure 
suboptimal economic outcomes, political authoritarianism, neo-imperial foreign policies, 
and defense policies, which are founded on the presupposition of an inherent a priori 
conflict with the West.  Russia cannot overcome these defects in its politics without 
redressing its deficient succession formula.  Indeed, the results of the failure to establish 
a viable succession formula already are visible in more aggressive, confrontational, and 
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even militarized policies that Russia cannot afford and that make no strategic sense, 
e.g. threats in Latin America.  They raise the specter of a factional struggle where one 
or another side may attempt to ingratiate themselves with Russia’s defense and security  
forces for personal political gain, or perhaps use those forces in that power struggle 
between rival factions.  Barring reform of this and other (no less crippling) political 
defects in Russia’s actual political constitution, Russia’s default option will remain this 
suboptimal, regressive, authoritarian, and even dangerous security policy.  Russian 
spokesmen frequently say that foreign policy is closely linked with their domestic policy, 
indeed, its main aim is to make it possible for Russia to develop peacefully.  
Paradoxically, it is Russia’s basic political structure that makes it impossible for either its 
domestic or foreign policy to ensure that it does develop peacefully.  And its unreformed 
succession formula might be the most serious vulnerability, the Achilles heel, of the 
entire system.
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